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1. Biodiversity cannot always be conserved. Economic development activities can result 
in biodiversity losses, but also increase human wellbeing, so trade-offs must 
sometimes be made between conservation and development. An alternative strategy 
to avoidance of impacts through the strict protection of biodiversity (‘prevention’) is to 
permit certain biodiversity losses and fully compensate for them through offsets 
elsewhere (‘cure’). 
2. Here, we build a stochastic simulation model to explore trade-offs between 
biodiversity loss prevention and cure, in the context of development under ‘no net 
loss’ (NNL) biodiversity policies. Our model implements a Management Strategy 
Evaluation framework, monitoring outcomes using four different performance metrics: 
total biodiversity, net biodiversity, total economic activity, and development activity.  
3. We find that a "cure" strategy can potentially perform just as well as a prevention 
strategy in terms of biodiversity objectives, whilst outperforming the latter from an 
economic perspective. However, this does not undermine the need for a mitigation 
hierarchy, and the best-performing strategy depends strongly upon both the degree 
of compliance with the NNL policy and upon underlying ecological parameters.  
4. Perhaps counterintuitively, when evaluated as advised by the technical literature (i.e. 
against an appropriate counterfactual scenario), we find that net biodiversity 
outcomes are highest when natural ecosystem recovery rates are slow (so long as 
development rates are also slow).  
5. Finally, using the illustrative example of US wetlands, we suggest that real-world NNL 
policies could already be driving landscape-scale avoidance of development impacts 
under a "prevention" approach. 
6. Policy implications. No net loss (NNL) biodiversity policy is currently being developed 
or implemented by over 100 countries worldwide and incorporated into environmental 
safeguards by multinational lenders. The socio-ecological model presented here can 
be used to advise decision makers about the best structure for nascent NNL policy on 
the basis of region-specific ecosystem recovery rates, development activity, legal 
compliance and monitoring uncertainty. Further, the model presents a means for 
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estimating the degree to which biodiversity impacts are avoided by developers under 
NNL – an important monitoring consideration given that ensuring high levels of 
avoidance is crucial to robust NNL policy, but which has to date evaded assessment 
through purely empirical means. 
 
Keywords: Biodiversity, biodiversity offsets, development, impact avoidance, 




It would be unrealistic to suggest that all biodiversity should be conserved at any cost. 
Economic development activities result in biodiversity losses (Venter et al., 2016), but also 
often increase human wellbeing – and, given the resultant ethical dilemma, there are trade-
offs to be made between achieving ecological and social objectives. An alternative strategy to 
the outright protection of biodiversity (‘prevention’ of losses) is to permit certain biodiversity 
losses, but compensate for them with ecological gains elsewhere (‘cure’ for losses). Our 
question, then, is when is it best to protect extant biodiversity and when is it best to 
compensate for its loss? This question goes to the heart of emerging environmental policies 
designed to fully compensate for biodiversity impacts associated with development: ‘no net 
loss’ policies (Arlidge et al., 2018). 
 
Conservation interventions characterised by an overarching policy objective that seeks no net 
loss (NNL) of biodiversity or better are being implemented far and wide (Maron et al., 2016). 
NNL interventions are implemented in response to ecologically damaging economic activities, 
requiring anticipated biodiversity impacts to be quantified and then either prevented or fully 
compensated for. NNL thus involves some calculation of development-associated biodiversity 
losses and gains, and some demonstration that gains balance losses (usually with a multiplier 
built in such that expected gains overcompensate expected losses, as a buffer against 
uncertainty; Moilanen et al., 2009). NNL is generally delivered through the application of a 
mitigation hierarchy, which involves sequentially seeking to avoid, minimise, remediate and 
finally offset any predicted impacts (Gardner et al., 2013).  
 
The preventative stages in the mitigation hierarchy (avoidance and minimisation) are often 
considered preferable from a conservation stakeholder standpoint (Lindenmayer et al., 2017; 
Phalan et al., 2017). But it cannot be assumed that avoidance of impacts always leads to the 
best outcomes for nature conservation under NNL (Bull et al., 2014) or more generally 
(Possingham et al., 2015). Moreover, avoidance, if leading to constraints on development 
activities, may not lead to optimal outcomes for social wellbeing once the full range of costs 
and benefits are taken into account (e.g. Bidaud et al., 2017). A crucial line of enquiry for NNL 
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is therefore to explore the degree to which a balance can be struck between preventative 
(avoidance, minimisation) and compensatory (remediation, offsets) actions. This makes NNL 
policy a good testbed for exploring the balance between biodiversity prevention and cure 
more generally. 
 
Empirical data on the balance between prevention and cure in the implementation of NNL 
policies are focused primarily on the final stage of the mitigation hierarchy, biodiversity 
offsetting. Offset data are typically poor quality and incomplete, and this is even more true 
when it comes to data on prevention measures (Bull et al., 2018; Bull & Strange, 2018; Sonter 
et al., 2018). Partly this is because NNL is implemented in complex socio-economic systems, 
where it is difficult to attribute causation e.g. for why a particular area of land was or was not 
developed, and so say whether this was as a result of a prevention strategy or coincidental. 
Anecdotally, some authors consider it likely that avoidance measures contribute substantially 
towards achieving NNL at the policy scale, but this is usually unrecorded (e.g. Levrel et al., 
2017). Overall, it is difficult to use existing data to make empirical judgements concerning the 
extent to which NNL policy drives avoidance of development impacts.  
 
Given this difficulty, there is a need to turn to alternative approaches to establish the degree 
to which impacts have been prevented, such as simulation modelling approaches. One 
potentially appropriate modelling framework in this regard is Management Strategy 
Evaluation. The Management Strategy Evaluation (MSE) conceptual framework underlies 
simulation-based decision support tools that have been applied extensively in the context of 
marine fisheries (Plagányi et al., 2013; Fulton et al., 2014). MSE has been employed in 
terrestrial situations (Chee & Wintle, 2010; Bunnefeld et al., 2011; Milner-Gulland, 2011), but 
never in relation to NNL policy. A strength of MSE is that it can be used to model the 
response of a natural resource stock to management whilst also including the actions of the 
managers themselves – both in monitoring the resource, and setting rules relating to its 
exploitation. Thus, the performance of different management strategies can be compared in 
the context of both the inherent system uncertainties, and against various stakeholder 
objectives (Milner-Gulland, 2011). Indeed, MSE provides a useful model framework when 
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“policies are sought that are feasible, robust to uncertainty, and which provide adequate 
management performance with respect to multiple criteria” (Bunnefeld et al., 2011).  
 
The MSE framework is composed of a feedback loop between four components: an operating 
model (the dynamics of a system, for example a natural resource and its users), an 
observation model (the process by which the system is monitored), an assessment model 
(describing how managers use the information generated by observation to set management 
rules) and an implementation model (in which the rules are applied to the system). When 
translated by Milner-Gulland (2011) to the terrestrial realm, the MSE operating and 
observation models were extended beyond the resource alone (traditional in fisheries 
applications) to include social components of the system. In turn, versions of the framework 
that incorporate subsistence alongside commercial harvesters have been developed for 
fisheries (Plagányi et al., 2013). More recently, MSE has been proposed as a possible means 
for building consensus in developing international conservation targets (Maxwell et al., 2015). 
 
Here, we treat terrestrial biodiversity as a natural resource, and use MSE to compare 
prevention (avoidance) versus cure (offset) measures as strategies for conserving biodiversity 
under NNL. In so doing, we search for robust approaches to the implementation of the 
mitigation hierarchy that balance competing objectives, whilst acknowledging the substantial 
uncertainties inherent in operationalising NNL. Subsequently, we illustrate how the model 
might be applied to evaluate the behaviour of a specific real-world compensatory biodiversity 
policy, using the example of US NNL wetlands policy. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Simulation model 
We use analogues for traditional components of the MSE conceptual framework to capture 
the approach taken in implementing NNL policies (Fig. 1). The key components of our model 
are thus the operating model (biodiversity dynamics), the assessment model (the 
policymaker, who sets and maintains rules on the basis of observations to deliver the relevant 
strategy), the implementation model (developers, who we assume both carry out 
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development activities and implement associated mitigation), and the observation model 
(monitoring by the policymaker, of both biodiversity and developer activities). Following 
Milner-Gulland (2011), we differentiate between monitoring within the model (by the 
policymaker) – which is subject to uncertainty both in terms of the data available to the 
policymaker and inherent stochasticity – and the performance metrics P1–P4, which 
represent the ‘true’ state of variables within the model (Fig. 1). 
 
Our focus is the degree to which the policymaker requires prevention of impacts versus cure 
for impacts. The set of strategies is therefore on a spectrum between total avoidance and 
total permission of impacts (with full compensation required). Given a known starting point for 
all model parameters, our model applies all MSE components once consecutively during each 
time step, and then repeats for 100 further time steps (unless otherwise specified). Change in 
variables is monitored throughout each simulation, and at the end of that specific simulation 
the final value for the four performance metrics is recorded. The simulation is repeated 50 
times, and the mean final value of each performance metric is reported. Model components 
are expressed in a set of dynamic equations coded in R (R Development Core Team, 2017) 
(Bull & Milner-Gulland, 2019), as follows. 
 
Biodiversity 
‘Biodiversity’ B represents some hypothetical component of an ecosystem of interest. In 
reality this might be e.g. species, habitats, some composite measure. It is common for 
policymakers to use a single indicator to track losses and gains under NNL policy (Quétier & 
Lavorel, 2011), making the use of a single variable B appropriate for biodiversity here, 
however, the model could readily be expanded to track multiple biodiversity indicators. B 
takes a normalised value between 0 and 100. At time t = 0, biodiversity (B0) = 99, i.e. 
biodiversity is very high at the beginning of the simulation, to model the introduction of NNL 
policy to a yet to be heavily exploited landscape. Note that in many real world cases NNL 
policy is applied to historically heavily modified and low biodiversity landscapes (Bull & 
Strange, 2018) – a situation which we capture in one of our scenarios and in the US wetlands 
case study (see below). The inherent trend in biodiversity is then for it to recover, and to do 
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so following a logistic equation – a reasonable assumption for either species or habitat 
recovery (Mace et al., 2008; Gordon et al., 2011). 
𝐵 =  
𝐾. 𝐵0. 𝑒
𝑟.𝑡






= 𝑟. (1 − 
𝐵
𝐾
) . 𝐵 
Equation (2) 
Where: B = biodiversity; t = time; r = intrinsic growth rate; K = 
carrying capacity = 100. 
The independent model parameter governing biodiversity is the biodiversity recovery rate r 
(equivalent to the intrinsic rate of population increase in population dynamics). Note also that 
the magnitude of the incremental change in biodiversity for each step is subject to some 
stochasticity, which we achieve by randomly selecting a value at each time step governed by 
a normal distribution (standard deviation = 0.2 x dB/dt) of the deterministic incremental 
change in biodiversity that would be realised under equation (2) for that time step. 
 
Monitoring 
The state of biodiversity is monitored by the policymaker with some uncertainty. Observed 
biodiversity is randomly selected at each time step from a normal distribution around ‘true’ 
biodiversity (standard deviation = 10). The policymaker also monitors the perceived outcomes 
of mitigation achieved by developers – but this is subject to uncertainty due to the level of 
compliance demonstrated by developers. Compliance with the policy on the part of the 
developers is unknown but important, and in many real world systems is likely rather less 
than 100% (Bull et al., 2014). Therefore, we conservatively choose a value for minimum 
proportional implementation (baseline scenario = 0.3) and randomly select a value between 
this and a value for maximum proportional implementation (baseline scenario = 0.5) for each 
time step, meaning that somewhere between 30-50% of required mitigation measures are 
actually implemented in practice by developers. The policymaker considers the requisite 
amount of mitigation to have been implemented, but the ‘true’ amount implemented is rather 
less. There are multiple additional sources of uncertainty that might arise in a real system 
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(Kujala et al., 2012), but we assume those already mentioned to be the key sources with 
respects to our simulation model (Bull et al., 2014). 
 
Policymaker 
The policymaker sets development constraints and mitigation requirements for the 
subsequent time step, based upon their observations of the state of biodiversity, guided by 
their overall strategy (see below). Requirements applied to developers are either to: (a) 
develop without mitigation; (b) develop but offset any associated impacts; or, (c) avoid 
development impacts entirely. The requirement is determined by biodiversity thresholds 
chosen for triggering (a – c), which are independent model parameters representing a 
different weighting applied to avoidance vs. offset strategies: 
∆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 =  {
∆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 𝑖𝑓 (𝐵𝑡 > 𝑇𝑀)  ⇒ 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 = 0
∆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 =  − 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 𝑖𝑓 (𝑇𝑀 >  𝐵𝑡 > 𝑇𝐴)
0 𝑖𝑓 (𝐵𝑡 < 𝑇𝐴)  ⇒ 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 = 0
 
Equation (3) 
Where: TM = threshold for requiring mitigation measures; TA = 
threshold for requiring avoidance measures; offsets = amount of 
compensation implemented. 
The main independent model parameters governing policymaking are therefore TM and TA, 
with the latter being the focus of attention in this study. Indeed, we set TM = 99 for all 
simulated scenarios reported here (meaning that all biodiversity impacts are subject to 
mitigation measures of some kind) as our interest is in trade-offs within the mitigation 
hierarchy. However, TM is retained for future implementations of the model. Note also that we 
do not incorporate multipliers into this version of the model (i.e. factors >1 applied to 
compensation requirements, which are common in many policies; Moilanen et al., 2009) as 
we prefer that our findings are conservative in terms of conservation outcomes, although to 
do so in future versions of the model would be trivial. 
 
Developers 
We assume that development tends to impact negatively upon biodiversity, and that over the 
course of the simulation (100 time steps) development would, if permitted to carry on as 
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usual, eventually lead to a total clearance of biodiversity at some time 𝑡 = 1 → 100. It is also 
assumed that the magnitude of development impacts decreases as the biological component 
in question becomes scarce across the entire system (an exponential decay function; 
equation 4). Such an assumption is consistent with development impacts that do not 
specifically target biodiversity, but instead create residual impacts upon it – meaning 
conceptually that development is simply constrained over time, as human development 
requirements reach equilibrium. In turn, simulated impacts do not currently extend to 
exploitation of specifically targeted resources (e.g. fish stocks), consistent with current NNL 
policies (Arlidge et al., 2018).  
𝐵𝑡 = 𝐵0𝑒
−𝜆.𝑡   
Equation (4) 
Where: λ = exponential decay constant; B0 = initial biodiversity = 
99. 
The equation governing development impacts upon biodiversity for each time step is the 
differential of equation (4): 
∆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑡+1 =  
𝑑𝐵𝑡
𝑑𝑡
=  −𝜆. 𝐵𝑡 
Equation (5) 
The main independent model parameter governing development impacts is the exponential 
decay constant (λ). 
 
The decision about whether to develop in any time step, apart from in cases of non-
compliance, depends upon the policymaker. If no mitigation is required (B>TM), then 
development is implemented with negative biodiversity impacts. If offsets are required (TM>B> 
TA), then development goes ahead and the equivalent amount of compensation is required as 
an offset – the assumption being made that capacity exists within the simulated ecosystem to 
physically increase biodiversity somehow without reversing the development (see ‘model 
applications’). A record is kept of the size of the necessary offset, and it is delivered (to the 
extent governed by compliance) over the subsequent time steps. The amount of offsets 
delivered during each time step is some proportion of the total offsets due (i.e. the ecological 
restoration debt) at that point in the simulation, a parameter that we vary within the model (for 
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baseline scenario = 0.2, meaning the offset is delivered over a 5-year period). However, if no 
development is permitted and avoidance is required (B<TA), then the associated development 
impacts are prevented for that time step. The ‘true’ negative impact upon biodiversity again 
depends upon compliance (and is therefore typically non-zero). 
 
Note: the assumption in the general case is that avoided development impacts are genuinely 
avoided i.e. not simply shifted elsewhere. In reality, avoidance might mean that development 
is shifted to another region (‘leakage’; Moilanen & Laitila, 2015) – but the focus of our model 
is on the impacts affecting some subcomponent of biodiversity more broadly, so we ignore 
leakage here (again, see ‘model applications’). Further, we have assumed for clarity that 
development impacts upon biodiversity are primarily negative, and those of conservation 
interventions are primarily positive – both assumptions are not strictly true in general for real 
world impact mitigation, but are reasonable approximations to make in the interests of not 
initially overcomplicating the model. 
 
Performance metrics 
We capture four performance metrics, representing the ‘true’ state of the system after 100 
time steps (Fig. 1). 
P1: Absolute value of biodiversity 
The main objective for conservationists is likely the absolute value of biodiversity 
remaining in the system (i.e. B). 
P2: Net value of biodiversity 
From the point of view of NNL policy, the key outcome is net value of biodiversity 
compared to some counterfactual (Gordon et al., 2011; Bull et al., 2014). Here, our 
counterfactual is the state of biodiversity had there been no anthropogenic 
intervention whatsoever i.e. the ‘no development’ counterfactual. Given our 
experimental set up, such a counterfactual scenario would mean that if biodiversity 
value was high (initially, or otherwise) it would remain high, and if it was in any way 
depleted it would recover following Equation 2. In turn, the net value of biodiversity = 
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[final value of biodiversity – final value of biodiversity given the counterfactual 
trajectory in the absence of development and mitigation]. 
P3: Total development plus offset activity 
From the perspective of actors in the system who are neither conservationists nor 
implementing the policy, a key metric is likely the total economic activity. So, our third 
metric = [sum total of development carried out + the sum total of offset activity carried 
out] (treating offsetting as an economic activity which provides utility to some actors, 
supported by fact that offset provision has become a high value market in countries 
with established offset policies). 
P4: Total development only 
For developers, it may be that the key metric is not total economic activity (including 
offsets) but the amount of traditional development only. For completeness, our fourth 
metric therefore captures the sum total of development. 
 
Scenarios 
The scenarios modelled are: 
a) The baseline scenario, parameters specified throughout the Methods; 
b) As (a), except biodiversity does not ‘bounce back’ if development stops (r = 0); 
c) As (a), but with high compliance (minimum = 0.8, maximum = 1.0); 
d) As (a), but with a lower starting value for biodiversity (B0 = 10). We choose this 
otherwise arbitrary value for B0 to represent a historically impoverished ecosystem. 
The purpose of the initial scenario-based approach is to investigate and illustrate the 
difference in results obtained through various alternative implementations of the model. In 
particular, we are interested in the difference in outcomes across performance metrics, for a 
prevention (avoidance) versus cure (offset) approach, and for a range of values in r and λ 
(both of which we varied across several orders of magnitude). 
 
We explore and contrast the outcomes across performance metrics P1 – P4 when varying 
key variables, including: 
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 Whether increasing compliance results in better or worse performance outcomes 
than shifting the avoidance and compensation thresholds; 
 To what extent the policymaker can achieve better or worse performance outcomes 
by focusing on ensuring compliance; and, 
 The range of possible performance outcomes given uncertainty about the ecological 
variables r and λ for recovering biodiversity. 
 
Finally, we implement the model using parameters that approximate the real world US NNL 
wetlands case study, one of the first modern conservation policies to include a ‘no net loss’ 
requirement (for wetland area and function). US wetlands policy provides a useful illustrative 
application of the model, being one of the more mature NNL policies (with correspondingly 
high implementation spanning a number of decades) and having some of the most readily 
available data (Bull & Strange, 2018). US developments that would negatively impact certain 
physical characteristics of extant wetlands (in practice, mainly the area) must either seek to 
avoid those impacts through redesign, or compensate for them through wetland habitat 
restoration/creation elsewhere in the state. In the contiguous US, 53% of the wetlands 
present when European settlers first arrived have been lost in 200 years (Dahl, 2010), so we 
set B0 ~ 47 and λ ~ 0.003. Recovery times for wetlands (in terms of ‘brackish’ systems 
returning to a pre-disturbance state on the basis of multiple indicators) are ~ 30 years (Jones 
& Schmitz, 2009), so we set r ~ 0.5 to give the appropriate restoration curve (equations 1, 2). 
We acknowledge that many US wetlands are not brackish systems, but again this analysis is 
intended to be illustrative – a more in-depth analysis would consider different wetland types 
with corresponding restoration curves. We run the simulation model for 50 years 
(approximate time the US wetland programme has been in operation; Maron et al., 2016). 
Assuming the approximate current area of wetland offsets as a percentage of overall area of 
wetlands in the contiguous US = 0.55 (calculated from Bull & Strange, 2018), we implement 
the model to estimate the value of TA in the US wetlands case. The application of the model 
to US wetlands is illustrative only, being based upon secondary datasets subject to 





Prevention vs. cure in the baseline case 
In the baseline case (a), absolute biodiversity (P1) is not significantly influenced by the 
strategy chosen, and ends up greater than zero (though less than B0) under a spectrum of 
strategies from prevention-focused to cure-focused. However, an avoidance strategy leads to 
slightly worse (more negative) net biodiversity outcomes P2. P2 is always negative, indicating 
a slight net loss rather than achievement of NNL. As the preference for avoidance exceeds a 
threshold of TA ~ 50%, the total economic activity P3 begins to drop sharply (Fig. 2). The 
unimodal dip in net biodiversity outcomes at higher values of TA, which consistently coincides 
with the value of TA at which total economic activity begins to drop off, is probably related to 
the imposed downwards trend in economic activity and lag on restoration in the model. 
 
Performance under other scenarios 
Under scenario (b), characterised by a deteriorating background trend in biodiversity, the 
performance metrics demonstrated similar functional forms as in the baseline scenario (a). A 
comparable amount of economic activity was undertaken (P3), but there was a far worse final 
outcome for absolute biodiversity P1. Crucially, scenario (b) resulted in an extremely negative 
net outcome for biodiversity (i.e. a large net loss), P2. Similar outcomes were achieved under 
scenario (d), characterised by a very low value of initial biodiversity B0. However, it was under 
scenario (d) alone that absolute biodiversity P1 was both higher at the end of the simulation 
than at the beginning, and also significantly higher using an avoidance strategy than an offset 
strategy (Table 1). This is a property of the logistic curve: absolute biodiversity gain is highest 
at 50% of the pristine natural biodiversity level (or carrying capacity, K), whilst the rate of 
biodiversity gain is highest when the amount of biodiversity B is very small, as the growth rate 
approximates the intrinsic recovery potential of the area (r). Therefore, it should not be 
surprising that offsetting outperforms avoidance as biodiversity approaches K. 
 
Scenario (c) was the case in which developers demonstrated high levels of compliance with 
rules set by the policymaker. In turn, this scenario resulted in the best outcomes for absolute 
biodiversity P1. But in addition, it was only under scenario (c) that net biodiversity P2 was 
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substantially positive (i.e. a net gain for biodiversity was achieved). Furthermore, this scenario 
resulted in the highest values for total economic value P3 (Table 1). 
 
Under most scenarios, final absolute (P1) and net (P2) biodiversity outcomes were only 
marginally different under an avoidance versus an offset strategy (Table 1), but with a clearly 
identifiable minimum value (see Fig. 2). Outcomes were perhaps unsurprisingly significantly 
lower for an avoidance vs. an offset strategy for metrics P3 and P4 – that is, whilst absolute 
and net biodiversity outcomes (P1, P2) were comparable, economic outcomes were 
substantially worse. 
 
Outcomes under varying compliance 
Whilst always significant, the quantitative difference in performance between an avoidance 
and offset strategy for economic outcomes P3 was substantially less as compliance with the 
policy decreased. Avoidance strategies performed better against this measure (i.e. higher 
values for P3) as compliance decreased, whereas offset strategies performed worse (Fig. 3). 
Of note in relation to monitoring of outcomes by the policymaker: if the policymaker’s 
expectation is that developers will largely comply with the policy, as modelled, then the gap 
between high and low compliance outcomes (Fig. 3) is also the gap between the 
policymaker’s predicted and observed outcomes, respectively. When monitored using P3 as a 
metric, an avoidance strategy might in fact lead to better outcomes than the policymaker 
expects, as a result of poorer-than-expected compliance. The opposite is true of P1 and P2, 
the mean values for which are significantly different at the end of the simulation under a high 
(0.9) vs. a low (0.3) compliance rate (high compliance: P1 = 83.5±1.0, P2 = 10.2±1.0, n = 50. 
Low compliance: P1 = 61.5±0.5, P2 = -11.8±0.5, n = 50. Independent t-test; p ~ 0, α = 0.05). 
 
Outcomes for biodiversity when varying r and λ 
Outcomes for biodiversity (P1, P2) are dependent upon the fixed parameters chosen for the 
model: the trend in development impacts (biodiversity decay rate λ), and the recovery 
potential of biodiversity (r). As might be expected, when λ is low, absolute biodiversity 
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outcomes (P1) are high for all r, whereas high λ results in low absolute biodiversity outcomes 
P1 for all r (Fig. 4a). 
 
Perhaps more counterintuitive are net biodiversity outcomes (P2; Fig. 4b). Net biodiversity is 
high and positive (P2 ~ +50) as both r and λ approach their lower limit (= 0.0001), but 
becomes marginally negative (P2 ~ –10) as r increases to the upper limit (= 0.63) since the 
counterfactual scenario in which there is no development is so high in relative terms. Equally, 
at large λ and small r, P2 is negative (P2 ~ –50), because there are major development 
impacts; and finally, as both λ and r increase to the upper limit, P2 reaches its minimum value 
(P2 ~ –90). 
 
US NNL of wetlands 
Simulation outcomes for the estimated values of TA in US NNL wetland policy are shown in 
Figure 5a. To achieve the observed extent of wetland offset activity noted in the US, under 
these parameters, a high level of avoidance (TA = 84-94% of wetland habitat by area) would 
be necessary (the model returns a value between TA = 90-91, but post-hoc analysis suggests 
TA = 90 is only significantly different from TA = 83 and from TA = 95). Notably, in all simulation 
runs the net outcome for biodiversity P2 in the US wetland case is marginally, but not 
significantly, negative, i.e. NNL is approximately achieved. In circumstantial support of the 
proposition that substantial avoidance has been taking place, US wetland extent has declined 
less rapidly in recent years, despite economic growth and population increase (Fig. 5b). 
 
Model applications 
The analytical simulation model we implement here is generalised, and does not reflect a real 
world case study (other than the illustrative application to US wetlands). It should be noted 
though that, in seeking to apply the model to case studies, certain constraints or modifications 
would need to be considered. We illustrate this here using three examples: a closer look at 
the aforementioned US wetlands case; the alternative example of bycatch in an industrial 




Example 1 – US wetlands: ‘biodiversity’ can be conceptualised in terms of the total area of 
wetland. All developments and wetland offsets take place within a continuous landscape, but 
the model considers only parcels of wetland nested within that broader mosaic. This means 
that ‘avoided’ development cannot be pushed into another wetland within the landscape, 
although the development can be pushed into a different habitat type (which we ignore in the 
development metrics, P3 and P4, as we are interested in development that has value in 
relation to wetlands only). Offsets can however take place elsewhere within the landscape, 
and be captured within metrics P1–P3, as wetland can be created (and since we are 
interested in amount of wetland, we count that and ignore loss of any other habitat types). 
Constraint: wetland offset opportunities are limited by the area of land available for wetland 
restoration outside of the model. 
 
Example 2 – fishery bycatch: application of NNL to fisheries bycatch has recently been 
discussed (Milner-Gulland et al., 2018). ‘Biodiversity’ in this case could be conceptualised as 
the population of a specific bycatch species (e.g. albatross), with the application of the 
mitigation hierarchy to impacts upon that species. Avoided impacts on biodiversity in the 
bycatch case are genuinely avoided (i.e. no leakage to other albatross populations). Offsets 
would be implemented somewhere elsewhere entirely in geographical terms (e.g. restoring 
breeding colonies for that specific albatross population) but still increase the value of 
biodiversity within the model. In such a case, there is no immediate limit to the amount of 
offsetting effort that can be implemented to increase the albatross population, until that 
population reaches K. Constraint: extent to which opportunities exist for increasing bycatch 
species’ population size. 
 
Example 3 – pristine forest: consider the case of pristine forests, with biodiversity measured 
in terms of ‘habitat condition x area’ (condition-area) of forest (Quétier & Lavorel, 2011). If 
development impacts upon a pristine forest are avoided, they either do not happen or they 
leak outside the region of interest (impacting upon unrelated biodiversity in another region), 
and we do not consider them further. If development does take place in the forest, we reduce 
the condition-area of the forest. However, we now have no acceptable offset options, 
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because the only possibility for offsetting within the otherwise pristine area of forest is to undo 
the recently implemented development. So the model would have to be modified, either: (a) 
reducing the threshold for requiring any impact mitigation whatsoever, such that a certain 
amount of development is possible before any mitigation is required, and then monitor which 
of these development impacts are reversible (to allow offsets); or (b) include an area beyond 
the forest within scope, say incorporating potential offset receptor sites (e.g. rangeland). In 
either case, there needs to be some constraint on the maximum possible development and 
offset opportunity, as biodiversity would be tied to a finite and limited resource (i.e. area of 
forest). Constraint: the degree to which undeveloped land is available for forest restoration 
within the model. 
 
Discussion 
Avoidance vs offsetting strategies 
The choice of conservation strategy (represented by TA) can be important in determining 
biodiversity outcomes under NNL. Our findings suggest there are multiple values of TA that 
can give desirable biodiversity outcomes, but the values of TA giving less desirable outcomes 
for biodiversity depend utterly upon the scenario and associated parameter values – i.e. it 
cannot be said that avoidance or offsetting will lead to better outcomes for biodiversity in 
general. This is important, given that conservation stakeholders will often tend to assume that 
prevention is the preferred strategy over cure (see also Possingham et al., 2015). Note that 
this conclusion applies to biodiversity that is replaceable or capable of recovering, not that 
which is irreplaceable (impacts upon which would ideally always be avoided). 
 
Indeed, in the baseline scenario, we find not only that absolute biodiversity outcome is not 
significantly influenced by the choice of strategy, but also that under a high avoidance 
strategy there is potential for a lose-lose: with both net outcomes for biodiversity and total 
economic activity at a minimum. That is, for the baseline scenario, across all four 
performance metrics, the avoidance strategy performs worse than the offset strategy. It 
cannot be assumed that economic activity correlates with social utility nor that it always 
negatively impacts biodiversity, but for some real world regions both are likely. In these 
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specific cases (but not in general) it would be rational to encourage offsetting over avoidance 
measures. 
 
To heavily caveat the previous point, achievement of a positive outcome depends upon 
compliance with the NNL policy. The NNL policy in general only delivers a true ‘no net loss or 
better’ for biodiversity when compliance is high. This underlines the importance of compliance 
in implementing NNL policies, and demonstrates that a lack of ability to ensure policy 
compliance is much more likely to result in policy failure than uncertainty about biodiversity 
recovery, or even the type of conservation strategy chosen. 
 
Absolute biodiversity outcomes are generally higher when the intrinsic biodiversity recovery 
rate is high and development rate is low, and outcomes are worse when the opposite is true. 
This is not unexpected. However, this does not translate into net biodiversity outcomes 
against the counterfactual scenario in which there is no development, which is technically the 
preferred means for evaluating outcomes (Maron et al., 2018). In the latter case, absolute 
development rate is not so influential upon outcomes as the interaction between development 
rate and inherent ability of biodiversity to recover – such that the best outcomes result when 
both biodiversity recovery and development rate are low, and the worst outcomes when both 
are high. Again, it cannot be assumed that systems with high development rates or low 
ecosystem recovery rates necessarily result in the worst outcomes for biodiversity. 
 
Real world avoidance measures 
Since relatively little attention has been paid to avoidance measures as a component of the 
mitigation hierarchy (Phalan et al., 2017), it is unknown to what extent NNL discourages 
impacts. Although some authors find the implementation of the Environmental Impact 
Assessment process to more often result in the reduction of impacts rather than their 
avoidance (Bigard et al., 2017), it is likely that avoidance plays a crucial, if under-reported role 




Whilst not empirical evidence, the application of our model to US wetland policy provides 
implicit support that avoidance measures could be making an overwhelmingly large 
contribution to US NNL outcomes. This would be consistent with qualitative suggestions that 
avoidance of impacts on wetlands, rather than wetland creation, is a key factor in US wetland 
impact mitigation policy (Dahl, 2010; Levrel et al., 2017). Note that real world applications of 
the model should be considered in the context of our many assumptions – the US result is 
entirely contingent, for instance, on our development function being valid. 
 
Our simulation model outcomes are qualitatively robust to changes in scenario, yet they do 
demonstrate quantitative sensitivity to the value of underlying key parameters (e.g. degree of 
compliance, initial biodiversity) and assumed counterfactual (deteriorating vs. improving 
biodiversity trend; Table 1). Despite incorporating stochasticity throughout the model, our 
outcomes exhibit small confidence intervals. This is a shortcoming of the model: the 
apparently overwhelming strength of built-in deterministic trends in relation to stochastic 
components. Given these findings in combination, we would not use our model as a 
predictive tool for NNL strategies in different socio-ecological systems. However, the model 
provides a useful basis upon which key parameters and uncertainties can be considered. 
Therefore, our model has further applications both in terms of the scientific exploration of 
NNL, and in developing robust real world NNL policy. 
 
Authors' contributions 
J.W.B. and E.J.M.G. conceived of and designed the simulation model. J.W.B. built the 
simulation model, generated results and carried out statistical analyses. J.W.B. and E.J.M.G. 
wrote the manuscript. Both authors approve the manuscript for publication. 
 
Acknowledgements 
J.W.B. was supported through a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship (grant number 655497), 
and acknowledges the Danish National Research Foundation for funding the Center for 




Data availability statement 
Simulation model code has been made publically available online (Bull & Milner-Gulland, 
2019; DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3490963). 
 
References 
Arlidge WNS, et al. (2018) A global mitigation hierarchy for nature conservation. BioScience, 
68(5):336-347. 
Bidaud C, et al. (2017) The sweet and the bitter: intertwined positive and negative social 
impacts of a biodiversity offset. Conserv Soc, 15:1-13.  
Bigard C, Pioch S & Thompson JD (2017) The inclusion of biodiversity in environmental 
impact assessment: Policy-related progress limited by gaps and semantic confusion. J 
Environ Manage, 200:35-45. 
Bull JW & Milner-Gulland (2019) joewbull/MSE_offsets: MSE biodiversity offset simulation 
model (Version v1.0). Zenodo. http://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3490963. 
Bull JW & Strange N (2018) The global extent of biodiversity offset implementation under no 
net loss policies. Nature Sustain, 1(12):790-798. 
Bull JW, et al. (2018) Data transparency regarding the implementation of European ‘no net 
loss’ biodiversity policies. Biol Conserv, 218:64-72.  
Bull JW, Gordon A, Law EA, Suttle KB & Milner-Gulland EJ (2014) Importance of baseline 
specification in evaluating conservation interventions and achieving no net loss of 
biodiversity. Conserv Biol, 28(3):799-809.  
Bunnefeld N, Hoshino E & Milner-Gulland EJ (2011) Management strategy evaluation: a 
powerful tool for conservation? Trends Ecol Evol, 26(9):441-447. 
Chee YE & Wintle BA (2010) Linking modelling, monitoring and management: an integrated 
approach to controlling overabundant wildlife. J Appl Ecol, DOI: 10.1111/j.1365-
2664.2010.01877.x. 
Dahl TE (2010) Status and trends of wetlands in the conterminous United States 2004-2009. 
US Fish and Wildlife Service; Washington, D.C., USA. 
22 
 
Fulton EA, Smith ADM, Smith DC & Johnson P (2014) An integrated approach is needed for 
ecosystem based fisheries management: insights from ecosystem-level management 
strategy evaluation. PLoS1, 9(1):e84242. 
Gardner TA, et al. (2013) Biodiversity offsets and the challenge of achieving no net loss. 
Conserv Biol, 27(6):1254-1264.  
Gordon A, Langford WT, Todd JA, White MD & Mullerworth DW (2011) Assessing the 
impacts of biodiversity offset policies. Environ Model Soft, 144:558-566. 
Jones HP & Schmitz OJ (2009) Rapid recovery of damaged ecosystems. PLoS1, 4(5):e5653. 
Kujala H, Burgman MA & Moilanen A (2012) Treatment of uncertainty in conservation under 
climate change. Conserv Lett, 6(2):73-85. 
Levrel H, Scemama P & Vaissiere A-C (2017) Should we be wary of mitigation banking? 
Evidence regarding the risks associated with this wetland offset arrangement in Florida. 
Ecol Econ, 135:136–149. 
Lindenmayer DB, et al. (2017) The anatomy of a failed offset. Biol Conserv, 210:286-292. 
Mace GM, et al. (2008) Quantification of extinction risk: IUCN’s system for classifying 
threatened species. Conserv Biol, 22:1424-1442.  
Maron M, et al. (2016) Taming a wicked problem: resolving controversies in biodiversity 
offsetting. BioScience, doi:10.1093/biosci/biw038. 
Maron M, et al. (2018) The many meanings of no net loss in environmental policy. Nature 
Sustain, 1:19–27.  
Maxwell SL, et al. (2015) Being smart about SMART environmental targets. Science, 
347(6226):1075-1076. 
Milner-Gulland EJ (2011) Integrating fisheries approaches and household utility models for 
improved resource management. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, 108(4):1741-1746. 
Milner-Gulland EJ, et al. (2018) Translating the terrestrial mitigation hierarchy to marine 
megafauna by-catch. Fish Fisheries, 19(3):547-561. 
Moilanen A & Laitila J (2015) Indirect leakage leads to a failure of avoided loss biodiversity 
offsetting. J Appl Ecol, 53(1):106-111. 
23 
 
Moilanen A, Teeffelen JA, Ben-Haim Y & Ferrier S (2009) How much compensation is 
enough? A framework for incorporating uncertainty and time discounting when 
calculating offset ratios for impacted habitat. Restor Ecol, 17:470–478. 
Nuno A, Bunnefeld N & Milner-Gulland EJ (2014). Managing social–ecological systems under 
uncertainty: implementation in the real world. Ecol Soc, 19(2):52. 
Phalan B, et al. (2017) Avoiding impacts on biodiversity through strengthening the first stage 
of the mitigation hierarchy. Oryx, DOI: 10.1017/S0030605316001034. 
Plagányi EE, et al. (2013) Integrating indigenous livelihood and lifestyle objectives in 
managing a natural resource. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, 110(9):3639-3644. 
Possingham HP, Bode M, Klein CJ (2015) Optimal conservation outcomes require both 
restoration and protection. PLoS Biology, 13(1):e1002052. 
Quétier F & Lavorel S (2011) Assessing ecological equivalence in biodiversity offset 
schemes: Key issues and solutions. Biol Conserv, 144(12):2991-2999. 
R Development Core Team (2017) R: A language and environment for statistical computing 
[available from: http://www.R-project.org/] [accessed 2017]. 
Sonter LJS, et al. (2018) Biodiversity offsets may miss opportunities to mitigate impacts on 
ecosystem services. Front Ecol Environ, DOI: 10.1002/fee.1781.  
Venter O, et al. (2016) Sixteen years of change in the global terrestrial human footprint and 
implications for biodiversity conservation. Nature Comm, doi:10.1038/ncomms12558.  
24 
 
Table 1: mean value for performance metrics P1 – P4 after 100 years, for scenarios (a) – (d), 
under an ‘avoidance’ strategy (TA = 95) vs. an ‘offset’ strategy (TA = 5).  Light shading = 
significant difference between the mean value for prevention vs. cure strategy, for the same 
performance metric and scenario (independent t-test; t = 2.00, p < 0.01). Uncertainty bounds 


















(a) baseline  
B0 = 99; 
r = 0.01; 
Comp.= 
    0.3-0.5; 
λ = 0.01 
Avoidance 65.6 ± 1.2 -7.7 ± 1.7 52.1 ± 0.3 51.3 ± 0.2 
Offsets 65.6 ± 0.1 -7.7 ± 0.1 99.0 ± 0.4 77.8 ± 0.1 
(b) no 
recovery 
B0 = 99; 
r = 0; 
Comp.= 
    0.3-0.5; 
λ = 0.01 
Avoidance 52.8 ± 1.3 2.6 ± 0.1 48.3 ± 0.2 47.6 ± 0.2 
Offsets 52.9 ± 2.0 2.7 ± 0.2 92.4 ± 0.4 72.3 ± 0.1 
(c) high 
compliance 
B0 = 99; 
r = 0.01; 
Comp.= 
    0.8-1.0; 
λ = 0.01 
Avoidance 83.6 ± 0.3 10.3 ± 0.3 31.3 ± 0.9 29.3 ± 0.6 
Offsets 85.0 ± 0.3 11.7 ± 0.3 133.4 ± 0.9 88.1 ± 0.2 
(d) low initial 
biodiversity 
B0 = 10; 
r = 0.01; 
Comp.= 
    0.3-0.5; 
λ = 0.01 
Avoidance 13.2 ± 0.1 -60.1 ± 0.1 7.0 ± 0.0 7.0 ± 0.0 





Figure 1: conceptual framework for the MSE simulation model, in the case of NNL policy. P1 
– P4 = the four performance indicators; sc. a – sc. d = the four main scenarios modelled. 
 
Figure 2: outcomes of the baseline scenario, as TA varies from 1 – 100 (x-axis; low TA = cure 
strategy, high TA = prevention strategy). Metrics are absolute biodiversity [P1], net biodiversity 
[P2], total economic activity [P3], total development [P4]. Error bars are 95% confidence 
intervals in outcomes (α = 0.05, N = 50). Inset: small scale version of the plot for P2, showing 
functional form. 
 
Figure 3: plot of total economic activity [P3] against mean compliance, under a ‘prevention’ 
(TA = 95) and ‘cure’ strategy (TA = 5). Vertical error bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
(α = 0.05, N = 50), horizontal error bars represent the simulated range in compliance rate 
(range = 0.2). All values of P3 were significantly different unless denoted on the figure (one-
way ANOVA with post-hoc Tukey test, α = 0.05). 
 
Figure 4: 3-dimensional plots of outcomes under variation in the independent variables r 
(biodiversity recovery) and λ (development impacts). (a) Absolute biodiversity outcome [P1], 
(b) net biodiversity outcome [P2]. Here, TA = 50, B0 = 99, average compliance = 0.4, K = 100. 
 
Figure 5: The US NNL for wetlands case study. (a) Proportional area of offsets created at the 
end of the simulation against variation in the value of TA (r = 0.5, λ = 0.003). Dashed line = 
estimate of proportional wetland area occupied by wetland offsets; blue shade = values of TA 
which are not significantly different from the value of TA predicted by the model (one-way 
ANOVA with post-hoc Tukey test, α = 0.05). (b) Recent change in wetland area across the 
contiguous USA (secondary y axis), human population and gross domestic product in 2009 
USD, adjusted for inflation (both primary y axis). Inset: rho and p-values (Spearman’s Rank 
Correlation). Data sources: US Fish and Wildlife Service, US Census Bureau, Council of 
Economic Advisors respectively. 
